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DEFENSE ACCESS TO GRAND JURY
TESTIMONY: A RIGHT IN SEARCH OF
A STANDARD
Although it had been previously recognized that a defendant was en-
titled to inspect grand jury testimony in certain circumstances, in
Dennis v. United States the Supreme Court first granted disclosure on
the ground that sufficient "particularized need" had been shown. Al-
though failing to clarify adequately the constituents of this verbal
formula or to define fully the procedure to be utilized, the Court
nevertheless clearly implied a disposition toward liberal disclosure. In
light of the lack of substantive specificity in Dennis, subsequent lower
court interpretations have generally emphasized the permissive tenor
of the opinion to promulgate rules of automatic disclosure in certain
factual situations. These rules, however, differ greatly in scope and
rationale. Consequently, the defendant to a federal indictment remains
unable to invoke any uniform standard by which his access to a grand
jury transcript may be determined. It is arguable that the confusion of
the present law may be remedied by providing the defendant with re-
course to a standard of disclosure based upon constitutional principles
mandating due process in criminal proceedings rather than solely upon
judicial discretion.
P erhaps best known for its illiberal interpretation of the Federal Con-
spiracy Statute,1 Dennis v. United States2 also marked the first in-
stance in which the Supreme Court identified the requisite "particularized
need ' 3 a defendant must demonstrate to gain access to the grand jury
testimony of a witness appearing in a federal trial. Although the Court had
previously recognized exceptions to the traditional rule of secrecy for grand
1 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
384 U.S. 855 (1966), rev'g 346 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1965), noted in 52 A.B.A.J.
868 (1966), 80 HARv. L. REv. 213 (1966), 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 233 (1967) and 28 U.
Prr. L. REv. 338 (1966). See also Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy,
1 JOHN MARSHALL J. PtAC. & PRoc. 18, 32-36 (1967). In Dennis the Court upheld
convictions of conspiracy to violate § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 9(h),
61 Stat. 146 (1947) (repealed by 73 Stat. 525 (1959) ), which denied use of the
NLRB to unions the officers of which failed to file non-Communist affidavits, despite
the fact that § 9(h) had previously been repealed. The lower court decision was re-
versed, however, for refusal by the trial judge to permit the defendants to inspect the
grand jury testimony of several government witnesses. See notes 48-68 infra and ac-
companying text.
3 The phrase "particularized need" first appeared in United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). See notes 30-40 infra and acompanying text.
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jury minutes4 where required by the "ends of justice,"5 or where
"particularized need"' 6 for the requested testimony was established by the
defendant, no case had arisen which mandated their application. 7
Moreover, since the Court had failed to define adequately the attributes of
those exceptional situations permitting disclosure,8 lower courts, left
relatively free to interpret the standards by which their discretion to grant
access should be guided, only infrequently found that the requirements had
been met? Judicial reappraisal in light of Dennis,10 however, indicates a
trend toward more liberal disclosure of the grand jury testimony of a witness
who has appeared at trial." Thus, utilizing the standard of "particularized
4 The rule of secrecy for grand jury minutes is currently delineated into five policy
considerations. See note 19 inIra and accompanying text.
r See note 21 infra.
6 See note 40 infra.
7 In each of the three instances prior to Dennis in which the Supreme Court con-
sidered a request for disclosure of grand jury minutes, the Court refused to find a
sufficient demonstration of need. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
8See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); note 42
infra and accompanying text.
9See, e.g., Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd after remand,
313 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963) (trial judge to
examine police officer's grand jury testimony and make available to the defense that
portion which is inconsistent with officer's trial testimony where officer was sole witness
and his testimony was uncorroborated and challenged); Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d
53 (10th Cir. 1961) (trial judge will not examine grand jury testimony in camera
where "particularized need" is not shown); United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86
(2d Cir. 1961) (trial judge must examine in camera the testimony of key government
witnesses regardless of whether defendant initially can make affirmative showing of pos-
sible inconsistency between grand jury and trial testimony); United States v. Papaioanu,
10 F.R.D. 517 (D. Del. 1950) (no "good cause" shown in defendant's request for
pretrial production of entire grand jury transcript so that he could understand charges
against him).
10 See notes 77-130 infra and accompanying text.
"
1See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968); National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 957 (1968); Worthy v. United States, 383 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Cargill
v. United States, 381 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Youngblood, 379
F.2d 365 (2d cir. 1967). But see Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913 (9th cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967); notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text. Where the
testimony sought was unrecorded, Dennis has been rendered inapplicable. See, e.g.,
Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966);
Campbell v. United States, 368 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1966). Dennis has also been in-
terpreted to compel, as a matter of right, pre-trial discovery of the grand jury testimony
given by corporate officers in a criminal antitrust suit. United States v. Aeroquip Corp.,
41 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Mich. 1966). See also Washington v. American Pipe & Constr.
Co., 41 F.R.D. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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need," 12 disclosure has been considered necessary where the testimony is
sought to impeach, test the credibility, or refresh the memory of a witness at
trial;13 where the Government has utilized the transcript;14 or merely where
a defendant seeks the testimony of the trial witness.' 5 Although these deci-
sions based disclosure upon Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),10
as did Dennis, it might be argued that disclosure of grand jury testimony
is, in many situations, necessary to insure that a defendant is afforded
constitutionally-compelled procedural protection. 17
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF GRAND JURY SECRECY
The doctrine of virtual sacrosanctity for grand jury proceedings
originated in the famous Earl of Shaftesbury Trial and was based upon
the need to protect jurors from the fear of vengeance by the ruler.18
Subsequently, additional rationales developed in support of the rule: (1)
prevention of escape by those indicted; (2) insurance of uninhibited
deliberation by the grand jurors; (3) prevention of subornation of perjury
or tampering with the witnesses; (4) encouragement of free disclosure by
witnesses; and (5) protection of the innocent accused against whom no true
bill was returned.19 Subsequently, however, the rule became qualified rather
12 See notes 77-136 inIra and accompanying test.
13 Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir. 1967). See notes 108-117
infra and accompanying text.
14 National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457, 461 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 957 (1968). See notes 118-130 infra and accompany-
ing text.
15 United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967). See notes 81-93
infra and accompanying text.
" FED. R. Cimv. P. 6(e) provides, in part, the following: "Disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations ... may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a
juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist
who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a ju-
dicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon
a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed
upon any person except in accordance with this rule."
17 See notes 147-165 infra and accompanying text.
18 See Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J.
PRAc. & PROc. 18, 19 (1967). Jurors feared reprisals if they failed to indict an ac-
cused whom the King wished convicted. Conversely, the accused claimed deprivation of
a fair trial since the jurors were influenced by their fear of the King. Calkins, Grand
Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455, 457-58 (1965).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md.
1931). See generally Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405
(1959) (dissenting opinion); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360 (McNaughton rev. ed,
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than absolute as many courts recognized that a prosecutor in criminal
litigation might have access, in the discretion of the trial judge, to grand
jury testimony in order to refresh the memory of a trial witness. 20 Moreover,
it was provided that once the functions of the grand jury terminated,2'
disclosure might ensue where application of the traditional rule would be
inconsistent with the "ends of justice,"22 although this term remained
undefined.23 Nevertheless, while recognizing that some theoretical situations
should compel exercise of the judge's discretion to grant disclosure, the
federal courts were extremely reluctant to find such an occasion.24
Apparently, this result rested at least in part upon the belief that the
accused already possessed sufficient advantage in a criminal proceeding and
consequently ought not to receive further benefits at the risk of debilitating
the ends achieved by the non-disclosure standard325 Even the promulga-
1961). It has been contended that the rule of secrecy is inapplicable once a witness has
appeared at trial since the reasons for the rule are no longer applicable. See Pittsburgh
Plate Glass, supra, at 406-07 (dissenting opinion); United States v. Youngblood, 379
F.2d 365, 370 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967); note 46 infra.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954) (defendant sought
his own grand jury testimony).
21 Once the functions of the grand jury have terminated, there is obviously no pos-
sibility that its proceedings will be adversely affected by disclosure.
2 2 In United States v. Socony-Vacuumn Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the de-
fendants were indicted for an alleged violation of the antitrust laws. During the trial,
the Government used portions of the grand jury transcript to refresh the memory of
several witnesses. The defense request for inspection of these segments of the transcript
was denied. The Supreme Court concluded that it was not error to allow prosecution
use of the transcript to refresh a witness's memory nor to deny inspection to the de-
fendant after such use, unless the denial was prejudicial. Id. at 234-35. According to
the Court, disclosure "after the grand jury's functions have ended.., is wholly proper
where the ends of justice require it." Id. at 234.
3 Id. at 233.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
accord, Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955), affd en bane, 235
F.2d 664, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517
(D. Del. 1950). See generally Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455
(1965); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L.
REv. 668 (1962).
2 The notion that the defendant possessed an advantage in a criminal proceeding
was crystallized in United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923): "[Disclosure
of grand jury minutes] is said to lie in [the] discretion [of the trial judge], and per-
haps it does, but no judge of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will. Under
our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. . . . No doubt grand juries
err and indictments are calamities to honest men, but we must work with human beings
and we can correct such errors only at too large a price." Id. at 649 (Hand, J.). This
admonition was subsequently emphasized by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Vol. 1968: 556]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tion of rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing
disclosure "when so directed by the Court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding, '26 failed to enhance the position of the defendant
seeking such an inspection.27 Given such judicial reticence, the burden of
proving "good cause"28 or that disclosure was required by "justice"29 was
virtually insurmountable. In fact, the defendant's plea to procure his own
grand jury testimony for use in his perjury trial was the only circumstance
under which inspection was consistently permitted.30
In 1958, however, a new liberality regarding disclosure arose with the
decision of the Supreme Court in Jencks v. United States.31 Finding re-
versible error in denial of a defendant's request for production of pre-trial
Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Del. 1950). See generally Calkins, The Fading
Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAc. & Pnoc. 18, 23-25 (1967).
Despite Judge Hand's position, however, the Second Circuit in which he sat has
been the most liberal in granting disclosure of grand jury testimony. See notes 81-93
infra and accompanying text.
26 See note 16 supra.
11 Many pre-Dennis cases held that rule (6(e) merely placed the decision to grant
disclosure within the discretion of the trial judge. In the absence of a showing of an
abuse of this discretion, denial of a request for inspection was not error. See, e.g., Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 396-99 (1959); Herzog v. United
States, 226 F.2d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1955), affld en bdnc, 235 F.2d 664, cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956). In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677 (1958), the trial judge invoked the "good cause" criterion of rule 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a standard to govern the granting of disclosure, id. at 683,
but failed to mention the discretionary authority permitted under rule 6(e). A num-
ber of subsequent lower court decisions similarly denied disclosure without reference to
rule 6(e). See, e.g., Berry v. United States, 295 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 955 (1962); Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961).
28See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958);
United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 519 (D. Del. 1950). In Papaioanu the
defendant sought pre-trial inspection of grand jury transcript, alleging that the witnesses
who had testified could not give competent evidence to establish probable cause. Re-
fusing the request, the court stated that "good cause," the "traditional test" to de-
termine whether production should be granted, had not been proven. The court failed,
however, to delineate the constituents of "good cause." Id. at 519.
29 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). See also
Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd en banc, 235 F.2d
664, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
1gSee United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954). In Rose the court
held that when a defendant seeks his own grand jury testimony, "disclosure would not
subvert any of the reasons traditionally given for the inviolability of grand jury pro-
ceedings." Id. at 630.
31353 U.S. 657 (1957). See generally Keeffe, Jinks and Jencks: A Study of
Jencks versus United States in Depth, 7 CATHoLIc U.L. REV. 91 (1958); Comment,
The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1959); Comment, 27
FoRDHAM L. REv. 244 (1958).
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reports made by a trial witness to government agents, the Court rejected the
prevalent notion that a defendant was required to lay a "preliminary
foundation of inconsistency" to gain disclosure.32 The Court added,
moreover, that the defendant, not the trial judge, should initially inspect the
reports since only the defense was suited to ascertain what documents might
be useful.33 Thus, the trial judge would resolve admissibility after inspection
by the defense, but could not himself determine the relevancy of the
material sought to the defendant's case. 4 Unfortunately, the Court did not
specify the extent of initial disclosure required under its new rules.
Consequently, alarmed that Jencks would allow a defendant unlimited
access to confidential government files, 35 Congress enacted the Jencks
Act.36 The Act purported to limit the Jencks decision to its facts and
32 353 U.s. at 666. A requirement that the defendant show inconsistency prior
to gaining inspection of grand jury testimony has been abandoned since the minutes are
usually necessary to show the inconsistency. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (dictum); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324,
325 n.2 (2d Cir. 1962). But cf. United States v. Boyance, 329 F.2d 372, 377 (3d Cir.
1964) (defendant must at least show "likelihoodof discrepancies". One commentator
observed that "[tjhe recent decision in Simmons [supra] may lead to the rule that
one should be entitled to an in camera inspection merely upon a showing that the
witness testified before the grand jury and that his testimony at trial is material to the
prosecution." G. SHADoA4, LAw AND TAcncs IN FEDERAL CRIMIAL CAsEs 202
(1964). According to a recent decision in the Second Circuit, a defendant is entitled to
direct inspection upon such a showing, subject only to the prosecutor's motion for a
protective order. See United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967); notes
106 & 139 infra and accompanying text.
33 353 U.S. at 669. The rationale supporting inspection by the defense was later
applied to grand jury testimony. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).34 When a defendant seeks grand jury testimony for use on cross-examination, a
mere showing that the reports relate to the trial testimony of the witness establishes
relevancy for the purpose of production and inspection. 353 U.S. at 669.
35See S. REP. Nos. 981 & 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H. R. REP. No. 700,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The Court, perhaps anticipating this reaction, had em-
phasized that the defendant in Jencks "did not propose any broad or blind fishing ex-
pedition" among government documents. 353 U.S. at 667. Nevertheless, Justice Clark's
admonition that the Court had afforded the criminal "a Roman holiday for rummaging
through confidential information as well as vital national secrets," id. at 681-82 (dis-
senting opinion), became the more accepted analysis 'of the decision.
36 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). The Act provides, inter alia:
"(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on the motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire con-
tents... relate ...the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant
for his examination and use.
"(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced...
contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness, the court shall order [delivery of] ... such statement for the inspection of
Vol. 1968: 556"I
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provided that the trial judge inspect the report and excise irrelevancies prior
to disclosure upon a government claim that the information sought is
extraneous to the defendant's case. Recognizing the restrictive intent of
Congress, the Supreme Court subsequently narrowed the purport of Jencks
to provide that the decision "had nothing to do with grand jury proceedings
and its language was not intended to encompass grand jury minutes."37
Following Jencks, the Supreme Court had two occasions upon which to
resolve the remaining difficulties regarding the secrecy of grand jury
testimony.38 Although in neither instance was the denial of disclosure
deemed improper, the Court did promulgate, in United States v. Procter &
Gamble Company,39 a comprehensive standard upon which a defendant
could rely in demanding disclosure of grand jury testimony. According to
the Court, "the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a
witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility and the like... are
cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted
discretely and limitedly." 40 Subsequent attempts by lower courts to apply
the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such
statement which do not relate.... With such material excised, the court shall then
direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use....
"(e) The term 'statement',... means-
"(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; or
"(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a tran-
scription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made
by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with
the making of such oral statement."
T Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959). Critics
have noted that there is really no difference with respect to the need for secrecy be-
tween grand jury minutes and Jencks-type statements. Thus, the abrupt conclusion that
Jencks does not apply to grand jury testimony seems unfounded. See Calkins, Grand
Jury Secrecy, 63 McH. L. REv. 455, 481 (1965); Comment, The Aftermath of the
Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297, 322-23, 326 (1959); Comment, 27 FORDHAM L.
Rav. 244, 253 (1958); Note, 62 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 233, 240-41 (1967); Note, 34
N.Y.U.L. REv. 606, 607-08 (1959). However, this inconsistency was not resolved in
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
38 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). In Pittsburgh Plate Glass the
petitioners appealed their conviction under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964), on the ground that they had been denied their right to inspect the grand testi-
mony of an important government witness who had appeared at trial. Affirming, the
Supreme Court found that no "particularized need" had been shown, and further noted
that "proof of the conspiracy was overwhelming aside from [the particular witness's]
... testimony." 360 U.S. at 397-98.
39 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
4Old. at 683. The constituents of "particularized need," however, were not made
clear by the opinion. Although the Court found the "relevancy and usefulness" of the
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the vague standard of "particularized need," 41 however, failed to liberalize
further the requirements of disclosure. Rather, these decisions indicated that
the grand jury testimony of a trial witness could not be procured absent a
showing of "need" greater than the mere intended use of the testimony for
the purposes stated in Procter & Gamble. Consequently, while denial of the
defendant's request for disclosure was occasionally considered error,42 most
courts failed to find the requisite urgency and continued to apply the
traditional rule of secrecy.43 Unfortunately, none of the courts discussing the
standard of "particularized need" attempted to delineate the scope and
content of the term beyond the description originally offered by the Supreme
Court.
Contemporaneously, however, an ostensibly separate development
indicated that the denial of a defendant's request for access to the grand
testimony "sufficiently established," this alone was not enough to gain disclosure. Rather,
some showing of "prejudice" or "injustice" was considered necessary. Id. at 682. Finding
such characteristics not present in this case, the Court concluded that the requirement of
"good cause" under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not been met
sufficiently to compel "wholesale discovery" of the grand jury testimony. id. at 683.41 See, e.g., Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 313 F.2d
582 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963); Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53
(10th Cir. 1961); United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 881 (1961). In Coduto a defendant convicted for narcotics'violations cited as
error the trial court's refusal to permit the inspection of the grand jury testimony of a
paid informer for the purpose of testing his credibility. Noting that "there was more
than ample evidence to substantiate the verdict of the jury," 284 F.2d at 467, the
Seventh Circuit held that the trial court was correct in finding that no "particularized
need" had been shown, id. at 468.4 2 See, e.g., Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 313 F.2d
582 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963); United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959). In
Hernandez the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when a defendant re-
quests an in camera inspection of the grand jury testimony of a key governmenll wit-
ness, failure by the trial court to comply is reversible error. 290 F.2d at 89. In Zborow-
ski the same court concluded that "particularized need" had been demonstrated when a
crucial government witness admitted to inconsistencies between his trial and grand jury
testimonies. 271 F.2d at 665.
4 3 See, e.g., United States v. Boyance, 329 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1964). In Boyance
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a refusal to grant the defense in-
spection of a government agent's grand jury testimony, noting that the circumstantial
evidence against the defendant was independently strong, and that the witness whose
testimony was sought was subjected to thorough cross-examination. See also Berry v.
United States, 295 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 955 (1962) (trial
judge did not abuse discretion 1in refusing to grant an in camera inspection); United
States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961).
Apparently, the attitude of the courts deviated'little from the view taken in Herzog v.
United States, 226 F.2d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1955), affl'd en bane, 235 F.2d 664,
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956), that only under a very clear showing of need should
the rules of secrecy be set aside.
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jury testimony of a witness appearing at trial may have constitutional
implications. In Brady v. Maryland44 the Supreme Court held that the
prosecution's knowing suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant's
case was inconsistent with due process. 45 Although the Court failed to refer
to any of the litigation concerning grand jury testimony or to Jencks, an
analogy between the situation in Brady and the withholding of grand jury
testimony which may contain favorable evidence seems clear. Thus, if the
grounds for secrecy are absent in a particular case,46 there seems to be little
discernible difference between the constitutionally impermissible suppres-
sion in Brady and the denial of access to grand jury testimony of signifi-
cance to the defendant. Nevertheless, the imposition of a constitutional
proscription in one case and the resort to judicial discretion in the others
remains unreconciled. 47
DENNIS v. UNITED STATES
In Dennis v. United States48 the Supreme Court first utilized the stan-
dard of "particularized need" to invalidate the denial of a defendant's
request to inspect the grand jury testimony of government witnesses
appearing at trial. The petitioners had been indicted for alleged violation of
the Federal Conspiracy Statute49 and at their trial requested the court to
allow inspection of the grand jury testimony of four important government
witnesses or, alternatively, to have the court inspect the requested portions
of the transcript for inconsistencies in testimony between the grand jury and
trial proceedings. 50 Although the petitioners desired to use this testimony for
the purpose of impeachment, a justification impliedly compelling under
Procter & Gamble,5' both motions were denied by the trial court on the
-373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 5 1 d. at 87. See notes 152-62 infra and accompanying text.
46As critics of the rule of secrecy note, once a witness has testified at trial the
traditional reasons for secrecy no longer exist. The first-to prevent escape of an
accused-and the fifth-to protect the innocent accused who is not indicted-clearly
do not apply upon commencement of trial. The second-to insure free deliberation by
the jurors-is also inapplicable, for the grand jury duties have ceased and the delibera-
tions and notes of the jurors are not open to inspection at all. The fourth reason-to
encourage freo disclosure by a witness-is of no force once a witness has appeared at
trial, for he is exposed to publicity and his trial testimonly will generally relate to that
given before the grand jury. Only if he committed perjury would harm from inspection
result, and this revelation is the very reason for which inspection is sought. The third
reason-to prevent tampering with a witness-is clearly inapplicable once 'the witness
has appeared at trial. United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 370 n.3 (2d Cir.
1967); see, e.g., Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MIcH. L. Rnv. 455, 460-65 (1965).
47 See notes 147-65 infra and accompanying text.
48 384 U.S. 855 (1966), rev'g 346 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1965).
49 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964). See note 2 supra.
50 384 U.S. at 868.
51See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
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ground that no "particularized need" was shown.52 The Court of Appeals
affirmed.53
Reversing, the Supreme Court recognized the "long established policy"
underlying the supression of grand jury proceedings in federal forums,54 but
emphasized that the consequent rule of non-disclosure was not unqualified.
Echoing Procter & Gable, the Court reiterated that the standard of
"particularized need" envisioned as permissible the use of grand jury
testimony to test the credibility of a witness at trial, to impeach him, or to
refresh his memory.5 5 Noting the Government's concession that need for
secrecy in the instant case was minimal, 56 the Court concluded that the
defense had not failed to demonstrate the requisite "need ' 57 and delineated
five factors compelling disclosure: (1) the time lag between the grand jury
testimony and the trial; (2) the importance of the witnesses' testimony to
the Government's case; (3) the fact that the witnesses' testimony was
largely uncorroborated; (4) the accomplice-informant status of the
witnesses; and (5) the admission by one of the witnesses that he had erred
in earlier statements concerning significant dates.58  Given these
circumstances, the "particularized need" was deemed "substantially beyond
the minimum required by Rule 6(e) and the prior decisions of this Court."59
52See Dennis v. United States, 346 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1965). Apparently, in view
of the other testimony at the trial, no inconsistency between the trial and grand jury
testimony of the witness would have been revealed. Id. at 18.
53Dennis v. United States, 346 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1965).
54 384 U.S. at 869, quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
681 (1958).
r' 384 U.S. at 870; see note 40 supra and accompanying text. The Court did not,
however, conclusively determine whether any one of the enumerated "cases of particu-
larized need" entitles a defendant, in every instance, to disclosure of related testimony
as a matter of right. This uncertainty existed prior to Dennis, see Bary v. United States,
292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961) (disclosure denied, though testimony sought for impeach-
ment purposes), and apparently remains a source of confusion, see Osborne v. United
States, 371 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967) (disclosure denied,
though testimoney sought for impeachment purposes); notes 77-80 infra and accom-
panying test.
10 384 U.S. at 869. The concession by the Government that the need for secrecy
in the instant case was minimal excluded the "state secret" objection to disclosure.
57 Id. at 871-72.
s Id. at 872-73. It has been contended that because these factors, with the excep-
tion of the fifth--admission of earlier error by the witness-are generally present in all
criminal proceedings, the standard of "particularized need" has been largely eviscerated
by Dennis. See Note, 28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 338, 341-42 (1966). This generality, how-
ever, does not appear to be wholly warranted in light of the post-Dennis decisions.
See, e.g., United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967); Osborne v.
United States, 371 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967).
r1 384 U.S. at 872; see note 16 supra. The "need" demonstrated in Dennis has
been characterized both as "overwhelming," see Note, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 233, 238
-39 n.30 (1967), and as no more than "tenuous," see Note, 28 U. Prrr. L. REy. 338,
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The Court failed, however, to define the constituents of the acceptable
"minimum" and, if the five factors were to be representative of that
standard, failed to provide guidance as to the relative weight to be given
each or to indicate whether the absence of any or all of the factors would be
determinative. 60 Although the consequent obscurity may have resulted from
a desire to avoid rigid rules governing the exercise of the trial judge's
discretion, the requirement of "particularized need" remained without
sufficient substance to make its application in a particular case the subject
of reliable prediction. Thus, while it was clear that the Court viewed
disclosure expansively and that the specified factors could be utilized to
invoke rule 6(e), development of a consistent approach ito disclosure
remained for the lower courts.
As indicating a modem trend toward liberal disclosure, the Court cited
the Jencks Act6' and emphasized that the proper administration of criminal
justice necessitated revelation of relevant information.62 Unlike the Jencks
Act, however, the Dennis decision was unclear regarding the procedure
through which a court was to make testimony available to the defendant.63
Apparently rejecting the procedure allowing a defendant, as a matter of
341-42 (1966). The latter view apparently rests on the assumption that since the five
factors cited by the Court in Dennis were so general as to be present in most cases,
the standard of "particularized need" was largely diluted. See note 58 supra and
accompanying text.
0 The language and tenor of the Dennis opinion indicates that all five factors
need not be present to establish "particularized need". See 384 U.S. at 868-75. How-
ever, the Court failed to indicate the comparative importance ascribable to each factor
listed. See Note, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 233, 236 (1967). It has been argued, however,
that despite the Court's failure to indicate if all or only a few of the factors need be
present, the facts that the witnesses' testimony was uncorroborated, and the crucial
importance of the testimony to the Government's case, established a sufficient showing
of need. Id. But cf. United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967);
Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967).
61384 U.S. at 871. But cf. notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
012 The Court stated emphatically that: "In our adversary system for determining
guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access
to a storehouse of relevant fact. Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the clearest
and most compelling considerations," 384 U.S. atx 873. Two points are worth noting
in this statement: (1) The Court eight years earlier had discarded "relevancy" and
"usefulness" as insufficient to establish the requisite need to gain disclosure. United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); (2) This seems to be a
reversal of the position taken in Procter & Gamble that the " 'indispensable secrecy
of grand jury proceedings' ... must not be broken except where there is a compelling
necessity." Id. The difference in emphasis may be explained by the difference in
facts, but it appears that the Court in Dennis made a conscious attempt to use language
almost parallel to that in Procter & Gamble. The use of such language may be
indicative of the Court's attempt to broaden the application of rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
63 See 384 U.S. at 874.
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right, to demand an in camera inspection,64 the Court further provided that
a judge should not be required to inspect the entire transcript and present
the defense with portions revealing inconsistencies since this procedure
would impose too great a burden upon trial courts.65 Rather, observing that
only an advocate can determine that which is proper and useful to the
defendant's case, the Court deemed the role of a trial judge properly
"limited to deciding whether a case has been made for production, and to
supervise this process: for example, to cause the elimination of extraneous
matter ... .,66 Arguably, this statement implies that a defendant has a right
to complete disclosure of a trial witness's grand jury testimony upon a
proper showing of "need," subject only to a governmental claim of privilege
for secret information.67 However, the Court failed to define precisely the
content of the phrase "to cause the elimination of extraneous matter." In
light of the Court's determination that the defense is best suited to inspect
the transcript and should, upon a showing of "need," be granted disclosure,
there does not appear to be any place for an in camera proceeding. But
if no in camera inspection occurs upon a demonstration of "need," there is
no apparent reason for a discussion of the trial judge's role, for, in the
absence of a motion for a protective order, it would be limited merely to
ordering disclosure.68
6 Id. In the Second Circuit, prior to the rule announced in United States v.
Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967), a defendant was entitled as a matter of
right to an in camera inspection of the grand jury testimony of a witness who had
testified at trial. If the judge found any inconsistencies, he was to disclose the incon-
sistent portions to the defendant. Id. at 368-69. Youngblood altered this procedure
slightly after the Dennis criticism, providing that if a defendant could show "partic-
ularized need," he was entitled to inspect the minutes without the in camera inspection.
Id. at 369.
6r 384 U.S. at 874-75. Dennis consequently indicates the Court's acceptance of
Justice Brennan's argument in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395 (1959), that "the defense alone can determine the pertinence of the material sought
to its case" Id. at 409 (dissenting opinion). See generally Calkins, The Fading Myth of
Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JON MARSHALL J. PRsc. & PROc. 18, 29-30 (1967).
66 384 U.S. at 875.
6 See 384 U.S. at 875. The state secret privilege is recognized in all circuits
which have had occasion to interpret Dennis. See note 139 infra and accompanying
text.
6s It has been noted that an inconsistency is raised by the Court's failure to explain
the precise import of the phrase "eliminate extraneous matter" in light of its determina-
tion that the judge should not assume the role of an advocate. See Note, 62 Nw. U.L.
REv. 233, 243 (1967). This same commentator is unable to resolve the inconsistency,
but believes that in light of the language of the Court, "the initial burden of deter-
mining relevancy [is placed] on the trial judge." Id. Nonetheless, this view is sub-
ject to the argument that Dennis, in rejecting in camera procedure on the ground
that it placed too great a burden on the judge, sought to place the burden of showing
relevancy on the defendant.
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In relying entirely upon the judicially prescribed Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which place disclosure at the discretion of the trial
judge,69 the Court may have been attempting to avoid the constitutional
overtones concerning due process which have haunted the decision in
Jencks20 It may be questioned, however, whether the constitutional issue
was wholly submerged since the Court observed that "[i]n our adversary
system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the
prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact. '71 This
statement, in light of the rationale of Brady v. Maryland,72 may indicate
that denying access to the grand jury testimony of a trial witness is
inconsistent with procedural guarantees of the Constitution. Although the
material sought in Brady was not grand jury testimony, it is nevertheless
arguable that the prohibition against governmental withholding of material
which might prove beneficial to a defendant's case should apply to the
grand jury transcript.73
69 FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e). See generally Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury
Secrecy, 1 JoHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 18, 33-34 (1967); Note, 62 NW. U.L.
Rnv. 233, 241-42 (1967).
7OSee Keeffe, supra note 31. Keeffe concludes that the Jencks decision rests
upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment, although he fails to explain fully
how that characterization may be substantiated. Id. at 91, 92. While the Supreme Court
did not claim a constitutional basis for its decision, it nevertheless has been elsewhere
contended that Jencks may have constitutional implications, See Comment, The Jencks
Legislation: The Status of the Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TEXAs L. REv.
595, 608-11 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 38 TExAs L. Rnv. 595 (1960)].
The argument is that since one element of a fair trial is the right of confrontation
provided by the sixth amendment, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965);
Note, 44 N.C.L. REv. 173 (1965), denying the defendant the opportunity to confront
effectively an adverse witness through the use of pretrial statements of impeachment
value is inconsistent with the due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Comment,
38 TEXAs L. Ruv. 595, 608-10 (1960). Yet, since the defendant cannot ascertain the
impeachment value of statements not within the statute until he has seen them, and
the 'disclosure is in the trial judge's discretion, the constitutional argument might fall
because of the defendant's want of standing. See id. at 610-11. See also notes 147-51
infra and accompanying text. In Jencks, however, the Court recognized that the de-
fendant is not required to demonstrate inconsistencies in order to compel disclosure, and
it would appear that this provision would apply to statements outside the Jencks Act
as well. See 353 U.S. at 666. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
360 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1959).
1384 U.S. at 873.
2373 U.S. 83 (1963).
73 The traditional rule of secrecy for grand jury proceedings has received intensive
criticism. See generally Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JoHN
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRoc. 18 (1967); Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 455 (1965); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149 (1960); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The
Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668 (1962); Traynor, Ground Lost
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Thus, while Dennis marked a liberal change in the Supreme Court's view
of grand jury secrecy, 74 the decision left several crucial problems for future
resolution: (1) determining the definition and role of "particularized need"
in obtaining disclosure of the grand jury transcript; (2) defining explicitly
the role of the trial judge upon a motion for disclosure; and (3) resolving
the constitutional issue involved in granting or denying inspection of the
grand jury testimony of a trial witness.
THE PROGENY OF DENNIS V. UNITED STATES
Although the immediate effect of Dennis was merely to reiterate the
standard of "particularized need" and illustrate an example of its
application without attempting to delineate the substantive constituents of
the term,75 the decision did emphasize a uniquely permissive approach to
disclosure of grand jury testimony. In this light, the significant decisions
interpreting Dennis have taken varying positions both as to the meaning of
that case and the proper scope of allowable disclosure. Thus, on one hand
Dennis has been considered to govern completely the scope of disclosure
while on the other the significance of the standard utilized has been largely
eviscerated.76
Clearly the most restrictive interpretation of Dennis is that promulgated
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Osborne v. United States.77
Accepting the narrow holding of Dennis, the court compared the facts of
that decision to those before it and concluded that none of the five factors
utilized by the Supreme Court to demonstrate "particularized need" were
present.78 Considering the presence of these factors essential to the
establishment of sufficient "need," the court consequently affirmed the
denial of the defendant's request for inspection. The court failed, however,
to indicate whether the result would have differed had some of the factors
been evident. Although Osborne may be sound as a literal interpretation of
Dennis, the decision appears unjustified in discarding the obvious expansive
and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964); Note, Disclosure
of Grand Jury Minutes to Challenge Indictments and Impeach Witnesses in Federal
Criminal Cases, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1182-94 (1963); Comment, 27 FORDHAM L.
REv. 244 (1958). See also Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967). For an analysis of the
inapplicability of the reasons for secrecy once the witness has testified at trial see note
46 supra.
*4 Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 Jon MARsmALL J. PRAc. &
PRoc. 18, 32 (1967). Calkins sees the Dennis decision as taking a "pragmatic approach
to the scope and intended purposes of the doctrine [of grand jury secrecy]." Id.
75 See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
11 Compare Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 946 (1967), with United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967).
7 371 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967).
78 Id. at 919.
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spirit adopted by the Supreme Court, for there is no indication in the Dennis
opinion that the factors there isolated must necessarily exist in all cases of
disclosure.79 Moreover, the effect of this decision is to imply that the
standard of rule 6(e) may be met only by the establishment of each of these
elements, a representation clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
characterization of the "need" shown in Dennis as "substantially beyond the
minimum required" by that rule.80
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Youngblood.81 Disposing
of the specific case before it on a rationale similar to that in Osborne, the
court affirmed denial of a motion for disclosure on the ground that only two
of the five elements constituting "particularized need" as defined by Dennis
wer6 present, thus implying that it considered that standard satisfied only if
all five factors were present.82 However, the court then undertook to
re-examine its practice with regard to disclosure apart from the standards
of Dennis.8 3 Viewing Procter & Gamble,84 Pittsburgh Plate Glass,85 and
Dennis as providing that disclosure is not compelled absent proof of
"particularized need," the court refused to construe these cases to permit
access only when that criteria is met.8 6 Rather, the court concluded that the
specified factors present only a "minimum standard" and fail to "limit the
court's power to order disclosure in additional situations where a showing of
particularized need has not been made. 87 Referring to Dennis further only
79 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868-75 (1966); note 60 supra and
accompanying text. The problem'raised by the silence of the Court as to the relative
weight to be ascribed each of the five factors is noted in 62 Nw. U.L. RPv. 233, 236
(1967). Examining pre-Dennis decisions in order to determine which of the factors
is deemed most critical by the lower courts in exercising their discretion under rule
6(e), the author concludes that where "the success of the government's case rested
mainly on testimony which was both uncorroborated and of doubtful credibilty ...
the presence of these [two] factors alone would seem to be a sufficient basis for an
examination . . . ." Id. at 238. In light of the more liberal post-Dennis deicsions,
however, it appears that it is not the specific need of the defendant which is critical,
but rather the general purpose for which the transcript is; to be used.
80 384 U.S. at 872.
81379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967).
82 The factors which the court considered to be present were: (1) that the
testimony sought was that of the key government witness; and (2) that witness's
testimony was partially uncorroborated. Id. at 368. However, the court viewed the
defense as one which "strains credulity." Id.
83 Id. at 3 69-70.
84 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). See notes 39-40
supra and accompanying text.85 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). See note 38
supra and accompanying text.




to note its emphasis upon liberal disclosure,88 the court exercised its
discretionary power to require that in future litigation the defendant be
entitled as a matter of right, upon request, to inspect those portions of the
grand jury transcript relating to the testimony of a trial witness regardless of
"particularized need."8 9 Although the court initially stressed the absence of
the traditional reasons for secrecy where the transcript is desired for
impeachment purposes, 90 the rule as ultimately framed does not appear
limited to that use but apparently attaches merely upon the witness'
testimony at trial.9'
Thus, Youngblood promulgates a bifurcated approach to disclosure: if
"particularized need" is demonstrated by the presence of the requisite
elements, disclosure is compelled, but that standard is not a requirement for
access and if not fulfilled, the discretion of the trial judge remains
determinative. Moreover, in providing that disclosure is automatically
available in a broad area, the court in effect utilizes the liberal spirit of
Dennis to remove the impediments to the establishment of "particularized
need." Consequently, Youngblood limits the significance of Dennis by
restricting the applicability of the case to its facts and largely render-
ing irrelevant the type of inquiry there utilized. Although Youngblood
arguably may be inconsistent with Dennis given the Supreme Court's
reliance upon "particularized need" as the appropriate standard, the Court
did not expressly mandate use of that requirement in determining
disclosure.92 On the other hand, Youngblood is not only clearly compatible
88 Id.
891 d. at 370. The court concluded "that a defendant should be entitled to see
all the grand jury testimony of each witness on the subjects about which that witness
testified at the defendant's trial." Id.
90 Id. at 3 69-70. Considering each of the five reasons usually presented to justify
secrecy, see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958);
note 19 supra and accompanying text, the court expressly found all to be inapplicable
once the witness had appeared at trial. 379 F.2d at 370 n.3. See note 46 supra.
91 See 379 F.2d at 370.
92 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869-74 (1966). The Court initially
observed that under rule 6(e) the trial judge had discretionary power to grant disclosure.
Id. at 869-70. The opinion then noted that in Pittsburgh Plate Glass "the entire Court
was agreed that upon a showing of 'partcularized need' defense counsel might have
access to relevant portions of the grand jury testimony of a trial witness... ." Id. at
870, and concluded that under the circumstances of Dennis the need shown by the
defendants went "substantially beyond" the minimum required by rule 6(e), Id. at
872. Thus, disclosure was mandated. Id. at 875. The opinion did not expressly state
that a showing of "particularized need" was essential to the exercise of a trial judge's
discretion under rule 6(e), although its reference to Pittsburgh Plate Glass may have
indicated that such a showing was essential in the past. Under Dennis, then, a demon-
stration )of "particularized need" eliminates the discretion of the trial judge to deny
disclosure. Nonetheless, Dennis' reliance on rule 6(e) indicates that there is still a
discretionary power in a trial judge to deny disclosure. If the rule is to be given
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with liberal disclosure but commendably resolves the ambiguity of Dennis93
to provide a viable rule of access unencumbered by pedantic adherence to
the traditional policy of secrecy.
Comparable in liberality, although varying in rationale, is the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Allen v. United
States.94 Noting the admonition in Dennis that disclosure best promotes the
proper administration of criminal justice,95 the court refused to require a
manifestation of "particularized need" in the absence of demonstrated
urgency for secrecy. 96 Rather, it emphasized that non-disclosure is
acceptable only in the most compelling circumstances and concluded that
Dennis made clear that the traditional arguments for secrecy were
inapplicable when the witness had testified at trial.97 The court went on,
however, to reject the breadth of disclosure allowable in Youngblood on the
ground that permitting disclosure in every instance might negate valid
reasons for secrecy and would often cause unnecessary delay in the trial.98
Rather, repudiating the standard of "particularized need" as obstructive of
useful discovery, the court held that in each case the factual context should
govern and the defendant must establish only a "semblance of need" as a
"threshold" requirement in order to insure against the evils of automatic
substantive effect, it seems that a discretionary denial of disclosure would be proper
when the defendant failed to show "particularized need." In short, the Dennis decision
arguably removed the discretionary power of the judge to deny disclosure upon a
demonstration of "particularized need," thereby inferentially holding that "need" would
no longer be a requirement for disclosure, foi in the absence of a showing of need,
the trial 'judge, in his discretion, might still grant inspection under rule 6(e). The
Youngblood court accepts this reason as the basis for its independent ruling. See notes
87-89 supra and accompanying text.
93 See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
" 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The defendant had been convicted of as-
sault and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle entirely on the testimony of a police
officer whose account of the incident relating to the arrest and alleged subsequent oral
confession were challenged both by the defendant and his witness. The defendant's
motion for production of the officer's grand jury testimony was denied when the five
factors found compelling in Dennis were not established. 390 F.2d at 480.
"Id. at 481, quoting Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
" 390 F.2d at 482. The court indicated that "the mere fact that a witness' prior
testimony was given to grand jurors is not a clear and compelling reason to immunize
it from later scrutiny after he has given testimony on the same subject at trial." Id.
at 480-81.
971d. The recognition that disclosure should be granted unless a compelling need
for secrecy is shown reverses the position initially adopted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), that the rule of secrecy
"must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity" for disclosure. Id.
at 682.
8 390 F.2d at 481-82.
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disclosure.99 Once this "need" is manifested, the burden of persuasion
apparently shifts to the prosecution. 100 Moreover, the court considered the
factors enumerated in Dennis to be merely exemplary of circumstances
showing "need" and thus not indispensable. 1 1 Finding no valid reason for
secrecy in the case before it, the court announced a per se rule that the
defendant had shown sufficient "need" for the -grand jury testimony of a
policeman who had testified in relation to a confession10
Clearly more permissive than Dennis, Allen arguably extends beyond
Youngblood as well. Although a formalistic impediment to disclosure is
retained in the requirement that some form of "need" be shown, the
substance of this standard is apparently minimal. Moreover, the District of
Columbia Circuit indicates, unlike Dennis or Youngblood, that in some
cases access may be compelled by pre-trial motion. 0 3 On the other hand,
there is little assurance that a prerequisite of a "semblance of need" will be
any less obfuscatory in application than that of "particularized need."
Consequently, the rule of automatic disclosure promulgated in Youngblood
may represent the perferable resolution with regard to facility of
administration.
Allen differs significantly -from Youngblood, however, in the manner
in which the court utilizes Dennis to rationalize its position. While only the
liberal tenor of Dennis is noted in support of the ultimate conclusion in
19 Id.
"I See Id. By lessening the showing of need necessary to compel disclosure,
the court apparently sought to place only a slight burden on the defendant. In effect,
the approach is to shift the issue from whether the defendant should see the material
in question to whether the material should be kept from the defendant. While it is
still incumbent upon the defendant to establish some need, the practical result of low-
ering the "threshold" requirement is to effectuate a presumption favoring disclosure.
'I Id. at 482.1021d. As indicated in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966), and
later determined in United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1967),
and Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849, 852 (10th Cir. 1967), the Allen 'court
agreed that part, or all, of the testimony could be suppressed on the basis of a proper
motion for a protective order by the government. 390 F.2d at 482.
... 390 F.2d at 482 n.16: "Indeed, unless the prosecutor represents that there is
substantial doubt whether the officer will testify at trial, we see no good reason why
the grand jury testimony should not be available through a pre-trial motion." How-
ever, the court referred solely to the situation in which a police officer testified in
relation to a confession by the defendant: "In the less usual case of a witness to a
confession who is not a police officer there may be more reason to defer production,
because of fear of tampering, and desire to encourage witnesses to testify before the
grand jury." Id. In light of the latter observation by the court, it would seem that pre-
trial discovery will remain more difficult to obtain than discovery after the witness has




Youngblood,10 4 Allen purports to interpret Dennis rather than distinguish it,
and finds in that decision both a restriction upon the role of secrecy and an
overriding demand for the fullest possible disclosure. 10 5 Stressing these
aspects, the court reads Dennis as a departure from the traditional
restrictive notions of "particularized need" toward a flexible contextual
consideration. Thus, Allen is arguably more consistent with Dennis since
it basically accepts the rationale of that descision as governing the scope
of grand jury transcript disclosure. On the other hand, both Allen and
Youngblood reject the "particularized need" standard expressly relied upon
by the Supreme Court.10 6
Conversely, two courts have retained the standard of "particularized
need," as in Osborne,10 7 but broadened the scope of available disclosure by
propounding liberal definitions of the phrase. Thus, in Cargill v. United
States0 8 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that where the
grand jury transcript is requested for the purpose of impeaching a witness,
testing his credibility, or refreshing his memory, "particularized need" is
shown and no additional facts need be demonstrated. 109 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the Dennis Court had "in effect" provided that access is
always available in these circumstances and thus, with regard to
cross-examination, had rejected the substance of the "particularized need"
104 379 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1967).105 The court considered the ultimate question in Dennis and in the case at bar to
be "whether the 'clearest and most compelling considerations' dictate that the grand
jury testimony... in contradistinction to other evidence the government might have,
be kept from the defendant," 390 F.2d at 480, and found Dennis to make it "clear
.. that when the request for disclosure is made by a criminal defendant who has al-
ready been indicted and when the request is for the prior testimony of a witness who
has already testified at trial, 'none of the reasons traditionally advanced to justify non-
disclosure ... are significant.'" Id. at 481.
o10 Youngblood discarded "particularized need" entirely, holding that once a wit-
ness has testified at trial the defendant is entitled, as a matter of right, to the witness's
grand jury testimony. 379 F. 2d at 369-70, while Allen noted that the "particularized
need" requirement was too stringent, and held that a lesser, though still undefined,
"semblance of need" standard was to be applied in the District of Columbia Circuit.
390 F.2d at 482.
107 Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 387 U.S.
946 (1967). See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
18 381 F. 2d 849 (10th Cir. 1967). Convicted of perjury, the defendant in Car-
gill claimed on appeal that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow him to inspect
the grand jury testimony of a government witness for possible use in cross-examination.
Upon the trial court's refusal to grant direct inspection, he sought and was granted an
in camera inspection of the grand jury transcript. When the trial judge concluded that
nothing of importance was contained in the transcript and refused to disclose the re-
quested portion, the defendant appealed his conviction. Id. at 850-51.
100 Id. at 852-53. The Cargill view appears logically more consistent with the ra-
tionale of Dennis than does that of Youngblood, which totally discards the standard of
"particularized need." See note 106 supra.
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requirement while retaining merely its form.110 Consequently, Cargill
accepted the Dennis standard but, unlike Osborne, provided a rule of
automatic disclosure which disregards the five factors enumerated in the
Dennis opinion. Thus, the Tenth Circuit effectuates in substance the
ultimate rule in Youngblood, although more narrowly delimited since it is
applicable only within the confines of cross-examination."' Moreover, the
court considers the efficacy of Dennis to be restricted to the three
enumerated uses of the grand jury testimony. 12 It is unclear from the
opinion whether the court would thus conclude that disclosure is
unavailable in other circumstances or merely that where a different use of
the transcript is intended the defendant would be required to present a
formal demonstration of "particularized need." If the latter is intended,
however, the court failed to indicate the criteria by which such a showing
would be judged; and, consequently, since Dennis would be inapplicable,
one seeking access is without any guides as to what he must demonstrate.
Despite the purported acceptance of the reasoning of Dennis,"3 Cargill
gives insufficient deference to the fact that the Supreme Court found it
necessary to consider the question of "particularized need" even though the
defendants apparently sought the transcript for cross-examination
purposes. 14 While the support for an unlimited rule may thus be suspect, it
is also questionable whether Dennis may properly be restricted solely to
disclosure for use in cross-examination. The Dennis Court's quotation of
the statement in Procter & Gamble to the effect that use for impeachment,
refreshing, or credibility testing purposes are instances of "particularized
need" was intended as merely illustrative of the modem trend toward liberal
disclosure.115 To the same end, the Court cited a decision allowing a private
plaintiff to utilize grand jury testimony in maintaining his suit 1 6 and, in
discussing procedural alternatives, referred to disclosure for "impeachment
110 381 F. 2d at 851-52.
Int While Youngblood referred to the use of the transcript for impeachment pur-
poses as constituting a situation where disclosure is mandatory, 379 F. 2d at 369-70,
the opinion does not indicate that automatic inspection is available only when such use
is intended, id. Rather, disclosure is mandatory once a witness has appeared at trial.
Id. The court in Cargill, in comparing its rule to that announced in Youngblood, ex-
pressly noted that its own pronouncement was slightly less broad. 381 F. 2d at 853.
=12 'The cases developing the rule announced in Dennis concern the use of testi-
mony in cross-examination to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, or to test
his credibility. In Dennis the transcripts were sought for such purposes, and we con-
sider that the opinion is implicitly so limited:' 381 F. 2d at 852-53.
'-= Id. at 852.
11 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 872-73 (1966).
'Id. at 870-71.
"Old. at 870 n. 15, citing Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F. 2d
431 (2d Cir. 1963).
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or other proper purposes."' 7 Nevertheless, despite these inconsistencies
with Dennis, Cargill promulgates a rule approximating the benefits of the
Youngblood decree both in clarity of availability and ease of
administration. Yet, the Cargill pronouncement is perhaps potentially more
acceptable to other courts since it is limited in scope and rests upon a
construction of Dennis rather than solely upon judicial discretion.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in National Dairy Products
Corporation v. United States,118 rejected Cargill and Youngblood as overly
broad, found Dennis to direct that where the prosecution has utilized the
grand jury transcript during the trial, "particularized need" has been shown
by that fact alone and the defendant may procure the portion of the
transcript used as well as other segments relating to the same subject
117 384 U.S. at 874. "Nor is it realistic to assume that the trial court's judgment
as to the utility of material for impeachment or other legitimate purposes, however
conscientiously made, would exhaust the possibilities." Id. at 874-75. Moreover, in light
of the recent emphasis upon "fairness" in criminal cases, it is arguable that disclosure
should not be limited to use in cross-examination. While the grand jury transcript may
have impeachment value, it is also quite possible that it may contain evidence favorable
to the defendant's case, in which situation disclosure may be necessary under the rule
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). See notes 152-58 infra and accompanying
text.
118384 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 957 (1968). National
Dairy was convicted in a criminal antitrust suit of violating the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1964). It appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in denying a request
to inspect portions of the grand jury transcript used by the Government to refresh the
memory of certain prosecution witnesses. In an initial decision handed down before
Dennis, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350
F. 2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965), but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to
the district court for reconsideration in light of Dennis, National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. United States, 384 U. S. 883 (1966). Again the trial court held against the de-
fendant, and again the defendant appealed on the grounds that the denial was incon-
sistent with Dennis. On the second appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed those counts in
the indictment upon which the Government bad presented evidence assisted by use of
the transcript. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 384 F. 2d 457 (8th Cir.
1967). Although the witnesses also gave testimony bearing on the issue of "intent"
under the other counts, the court found these unaffected by the non-disclosure since
there was substantial other evidence and the use of the transcript was of minimal aid
with regard to the testimony on this issue. Id. at 462. Subsequently, the defendant pe-
titioned the Supreme Court for certiorari a second time, alleging that the Eighth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Dennis was incorrect because its effect would be to legitimitize
non-disclosure despite demonstration of "particularized need" if other evidence sup-
ported the verdict and the transcript was of little aid to the Government. 36 U.S.L.W.
3265 (U. S. Jan. 2, 1968) (No. 935); see BNA ANTnTRusT & TRADE Ruo. REP. No.
338, at A-2 to -3 (Jan. 2, 1968). Furthermore, National Dairy alleged that denial
of access to the grand jury testimony deprived it of its rights under the fifth and sixth
amendments by preventing effective cross-examination. BNA ANTITRuST & TRADE Rno.
REP. at A-3. However, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. National Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. United States,- U. S. - (1968).
[Vol. 1968: 556
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
matter.1 19 Noting that Dennis had confirmed the discretion of trial courts
under rule 6(e), 2 0 the court emphasized the quote in Dennis from Procter
& Gamble12 1 to conclude that the effect of the decision was to restrict the
discretionary power of the court to deny disclosure where the prosecution
utilized the transcript to refresh the recollection of government witnesses or,
apparently, for either of the other purposes stated in Procter & Gamble.-22
Thus, National Dairy promulgates a significantly different and more
limited interpretation of Dennis than does Cargill: while Cargill would
grant disclosure whenever requested by the defense for any of the three
purposes, National Dairy finds "need" immediately satisfied only if the
transcript is utilized by the Government during the trial.
Where the Government has not taken advantage of the grand jury
testimony, the court construed Dennis to require that the existence of
"particularized need" be determined according to the characteristics of each
case and considered the function of Dennis to have been a demonstration of
the fact that "need" may exist even where the transcript has not been
utilized at trial. 23 Thus, although the opinion is unclear, it would seem
arguable that the court would adhere to the factor analysis outlined in
Dennis to determine the presence of sufficient "circumstances" in those
n 384 F. 2d at 460. "We do not regard the holding in Dennis to require the
practice adopted ... in Youngblood .... Neither do we subscribe to the concept that
the defense is entitled to the grand jury transcript upon timely request irrespective of
the circumstances involved which seems to be the rule... in Cargill ... ." Id. at 461.
The court did not attempt to distinguish either Youngblood or Cargill, but observed
that, unlike the rules promulgated in those two decisions, the Eighth Circuit would
adhere to the standard of "particularized need" in granting disclosure, as utilized in
Dennis, by evaluating the circumstances of each individual case. Id. The court did not
reveal the analysis which compelled its holding, nor is there textual support for the
conclusion that Dennis "enunciat[ed] the proposition that where the district court per-
mits the Government to use the grand jury transcript... a showing of particularized
need has been made. .. ." Id. at 460. In the limited sense that this conclusion by the
court is, in fact, within the Dennis rule, it is correct. However, the court assumes it is
the only situation in which disclosure should be automatic.
120 id. at 459.
121 Id. See notes 55 & 115 supra and accompanying text.
122 384 F. 2d at 459. There does not appear to be precedential support for the con-
clusion of the Eighth Circuit that the trial court's discretion should be limited only when
the Government has utilized the transcript. Neither the unusual statement in United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677, 683 (1958), nor the quotationtin
Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 870 (1966), give any indication that the
phrase "problems concerning the use of the grand jury transcript" refers only to its use
by the Government. Moreover, the Government had not utilized the transcript at trial
in Procter & Gamble, but rather the litigation concerned a request for the grand jury
testimony for pre-trial use in preparing the defense. United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., supra at 678-79.
123 384 F. 2d at 460.
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cases without the liberal rule. This contention is supported by the fact that
the district court was reversed not because its application of the five factors
present in Dennis to determine "need" was itself incorrect, but because the
standard promulgated by Dennis "applicable to this case" had been
misinterpreted. 12 Thus, the effect of National Dairy is to grant to the
prosecution an undue advantage in that it has within its discretion the means
to effectively restrict the disclosure available to the defense.
Although the court clearly purported to base its rule upon Dennis, it is
difficult to find any express support in that opinion for the position taken by
the Eighth Circuit. Moreover, while the court notes Youngblood and
Cargill as support for its views, those decisions do not give any
determinative effect, nor even refer, to the prosecution's use of the grand
jury transcript.125 On the other hand, Dennis also would not specifically
preclude the National Dairy rule. While the court failed to indicate why its
decision would not infringe upon valid reasons for secrecy, there would
seem to be no difficulty since the transcript would not be divulged until the
witness had appeared at trial.126 However, it may be contended that
National Dairy is inconsistent with the emphasis in Dennis upon the power
of the trial court to determine disclosure under rule 6 (e)127 since it grants
to the prosecution the power to decide whether the defense will receive the
transcript merely upon request or will be required to sustain the difficult
burden, as shown by Osborne'2 8 and Youngblood,129 of proving
"particularized need" under a literal reading of Dennis."0
It seems clear from the above decisions that the courts have been unable
to derive from Dennis a uniform interpretation of the requirements a
defendant must meet to attain access to grand jury testimony. Rather, it
would appear that Dennis has been utilized by each court to achieve what it
considers the proper rule, a function to which Dennis is well suited by its
ambiguity.131 Although no one of the decisions would be clearly overruled
by Dennis, it is equally arguable that their rules gain no express support
= Id. at 459.
12 Id. at 460.
126 Once the witness has appeared at trial, the reasons for secrecy are no longer
applicable. See note 46 supra.
m-r See note 16 supra.
18See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
129 Although Youngblood renounced the standard of "particularized need" as a
requirement for gaining disclosure once a witness has testified at trial, 379 F. 2d at 370,
in the instant case the court applied the "five factors" test employed in Dennis, 384
U. S. at 872-73, and held that as only two of the factors were present, denial of the
defendant's request for disclosure was not improper. '379 F. 2d at 368.
120 See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
1 See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text.
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from that opinion. On the other hand, all but Osborne 32 are clearly
compatible with the permissive tenor of the Dennis opinion and find in that
attitude the primary justification for their promulgations. Consequently, the
overall result has been to utilize the generalities of Dennis to significantly
liberalize disclosure so that in most of the cases the defendant has at least
one relatively unimpeded avenue to access, and in all cases the
requirements he must meet are markedly more distinct. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that the standard of "particularized need," although
denuded of substance in some circumstances, 33 remains a relevant term
under all but the Allen decision, 34 and the courts have apparently given the
standard a restrictive interpretation based upon a literal reading of Dennis
in those situations where their expansive rules are inapplicable.'35 The
courts have, however, relegated the traditional secrecy justifications to a
role consistent with the ends they are intended to serve and thereby have
significantly alleviated the unfair prosecutorial advantage inherent in
"exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact."' 36
Aside from the requisites of permissible disclosure, the Dennis opinion
was also unclear regarding the procedures to be followed in making the
grand jury transcript available to the defendant once the propriety of
132 Osborne v. United States, 371 F. 2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U. S.
946 (1967). See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
'In United States v. Youngblood, 379 F. 2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967), demonstration
of "particularized need" was declared unnecessary to gain disclosure once a witness had
appeared at trial. Id. at 370. See note 106 supra & notes 81-93 supra and accompany-
ing text. Cargill v. United States, 381 F. 2d 849 (10th Cir. 1967), while maintaining
the standard of "particularized need," effectively eliminated it where the request for
the grand jury testimony was for use in cross-examination. Id. at 852-53. See notes
108-12 supra and accompanying text.
134 Allen observed that in light of the trend toward more liberal disclosure, Dennis
should be interpreted as lowering the minimum amount of need necessary to gain
disclosure. 390 F.2d at 481-82. Thus, the court held that the defendant is entitled to
inspection upon a showing of a "semblence of need." Id. However, aside from the
inference that the new standard is less stringent than that of "particularized need," the
court failed to define the term "semblence of need."
Iss See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 384 F. 2d 457 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 957 (1968); Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849 (10th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Youngblood, 379 F. 2d 365, 367-69 (2d Cir. 1967);
Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913, 919 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946
(1967).
"' Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966). The realization that the
prosecution holds an unfair advantage if disclosure is wholly denied to a defendant is a
conclusion inconsistent with the belief propounded by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), that since "[u]nder our criminal
procedure the accused has every advantage," inspection of grand jury minutes by a
defendant should not be permitted. Id. at 649.
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disclosure had been determined. 137 However, contrary to their conflicting
views upon the requirements for access, the subsequent decisions have been
relatively uniform in the proceedings adopted to transmit relevant portions
of the transcript to the defense. Thus, four of the courts apparently agree
that the defendant should receive the relevant portions of the transcript
directly upon request whenever that request falls within the particular
court's rule governing the availability of disclosure.138 Concomitantly, three
courts provide that in camera inspection by the trial judge preceding
delivery to the defendant is permissible only where necessary to determine if
all or portions of the material should be withheld pursuant to a motion for a
protective order by the Government.13 9 Both of these provisions seem
clearly consistent with Dennis.140
Cargill is ambiguous concerning the availability of disclosure beyond
the precise doctrine of that case and consequently fails to discuss the
appropriate disclosure procedures in such circumstances, 141 and it is
questionable whether National Dairy considers an in camera inspection
relevant under its holding.142 Nevertheless, the only decision which does not
137 See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
1.8 See Worthy v. United States, 383 F. 2d 524, 525 (D. C. Cir. 1967) (per
curiam); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457. 460 (8th
Cir. 1967); Cargill v. United States. 381 F.2d 849, 852-53 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Youngblood, 379 F. 2d 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1967). In Worthy the issue was
whether a denial of disclosure upon a demonstration of "particularized need" consti-
tuted reversible error, even though the defendant could not prove that prejudice had
resulted from the denial. 383 F. 2d at 525. The District of Columbia Circuit held, in
light of Dennis, that disclosure could not be refused to a defendant showing the requi-
site need, even if the trial judge felt that no prejudicei would result from non-disclosure.
Id. This holding, in conjunction with Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); notes 94-106 supra and accompanying text, clearly indicates that the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit may be counted among the courts which would provide
direct disclosure once the imposed prerequisite has been met.
"'See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476, 481-82 (D. C. Cir. 1968);
Cargill v. United States, 381 F. 2d 849, 852 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Youngblood, 379 F. 2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1967).
140 See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
'14 The Tenth Circuit held explicitly that a. defendant is entitled under the mandate
of Dennis to disclosure as a matter of right without an in camera inspection if he seeks
the testimony for cross-examination purposes. 381 F. 2d at 852. However, the court
did not indicate the procedure to be followed for obtaining testimony sought for some
other purpose, but, rather, construed Dennis to apply only to the use of grand jury
transcripts for cross-examination purposes. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
If under other circumstances the role of the trial judge is to inspect the transcript and
eliminate "extraneous matter," then the judge would, contrary to Dennis, assume the
role of the advocate, determining what is useful to the defendant's case. Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
142 "[We are led to believe that in a case where, as here, the government is per-
mitted at trial to use the grand jury transcript, the discretionary power of the district
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clearly recognize the propriety of direct access is Osborne. Concluding
disclosure to have been correctly denied since "particularized need" as
required by Dennis had not been shown,14 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit added merely that the trial judge "in an abundance of caution
[might have granted] an in camera inspection appropriate when there is a
showing of 'particularized need.' "144 If this statement indicates that a
minimum showing of "particularized need" is necessary to obtain any
inspection,145 the court's position seems inconsistent with the admonition in
Dennis that only an advocate can "properly and effectively" discern that
which is useful to the defense.146 Nevertheless, it would appear that the
ambiguity of Dennis regarding procedural mechanics has been primarily
illusory and that a common approach is at least in the process of
development.
The decisions in Allen, Cargill, National Dairy, Osborne, and Young-
blood ultimately reveal an inherent weakness in the Dennis opinion. Rest-
ing its decision upon the flexible standard of "particularized need" and
the discretionary powers of the trial judge under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6 (e), Dennis provides the courts with the means to promulgate
widely varying delineations of both the scope of access available to the
defendant and the burden which must be carried to accomplish disclosure.
A more uniform approach may be founded upon a constitutional basis.
Initially, it may be contended that the sixth amendment 47 right to
confrontation provides grounds upon which a defendant may compel
disclosure of grand jury testimony. This guarantee encompasses, and is
court to limit disclosure is restricted." 384 F. 2d at 459. In a footnote to this statement,
the court stated that although the Supreme Court had "recognized that in camera inspec-
tion by the trial judge may be useful for certain purposes, ... that ... by no means
disposes of the matter." Id. at n.4. The court continued by quoting from Dennis to
the effect that the judge's role in disclosure should be limited and that a proper deter-
mination of what is useful to the defendant can only be made by an advocate. Id. Since
the court concluded that in the above situation the trial judge must grant disclosure,
id. at 460, an in camera inspection would seemingly be irrelevant since the court no
longer may exercise any discretion, but must produce the requested testimony.
43 Osborne v. United States, 371 F. 2d 913, 919 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 946 (1967). See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
144 371 F. 2d at 919.
145 The basis of the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of
"particularized need" simply to obtain an in camera inspection of the requested portion
of the grand jury testimony rests in the assumption that if direct disclosure were
mandatory upon a showing of "particularized need" there would be no necessity for
an in camera inspection, since the trial judge could not deny disclosure. See note 138
supra.
.,. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
147 The sixth amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witness against him ...."
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primarily based upon, the right to an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, including the opportunity to impeach the testimony
given. 148 A grand jury transcript may often include testimony of
unquestioned impeachment value to the defense without which
confrontation would be ineffective. Thus, to ensure the defendant the full
potential of his opportunity for cross-examination, it is at least arguable
that the sixth amendment should compell disclosure of relevant portions of a
grand jury transcript. 149 Since the testimony would not be available until
after the witness has appeared at trial, traditional arguments for secrecy
should be of minimal efficacy. 150 Consequently, there would seem to be little
difficulty in permitting the defendant to inspect relevant portions of the
transcript upon request, subject only to a protective order. The resultant
rule would approximate that in Youngblood151 but, as constitutionally
based, would receive common application. Moreover, if some form of
regulation over the ultimate use of the transcript is considered necessary, it
could be provided that the material may not be utilized at trial unless bona
fide impeachment value is demonstrated to the trial judge. In this manner,
the defendant's ability to effectively cross-examine would be maximized
while the dangers of wholesale disclosure would still be avoided.
A broader scope of disclosure may be based upon considerations of due
process under the fifth amendment. In Brady v. Maryland152 the Supreme
"'8See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); 5 J. Wia-
MORE, EvEDENcE § 1397 (3d ed. 1940); McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959
WAS H. U. L. Q. 122, 123-26; Note, 44 N. C. L. REv. 173, 175 (1965); Comment, 38
TExAs L. Rv. 595, 609 (1960). In Kirby the Supreme Court considered the sixth
amendment to require that facts establishable "only by witnesses cannot be proved
against an accused ... except by witnesses who confront him at the trial .... whom
he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode
authorized by the... rules governing the trial .... ." 174 U.S. at 55. Moreover, in
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), the Court, considering a statute
modeled after the sixth amendment, held that the federal standard was "intended...
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness
in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." Id. at 330.
149 See notes 118 & 148 supra; cf. Comment, 38 TExAs L. REv. 595, 608-11
(1960). The right to confrontation may not be satisfied unless the accused has an
opportunity for effective cross-examination. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965),
noted in 44 N. C. L. REv. 173 (1965).
150 See note 46 supra.
151 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Ashley
v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963). See generally
Comment, Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal Cases: Where Are We Headed?, 6
DUQUESNE L. REv. 41, 45-50 (1967); Note, The Prosecuting Attorney's Duty to
Disclose, 6 WASnBuRN L. J. 479, 487-92 (1967); Comment, The Prosecutor's Consti.
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Court held that the failure of the prosecution to satisfy a request for
material evidence favorable to the defendant was inconsistent with the
requirements of due process since its effect was to lead to an unfair trial.153
Because grand jury testimony may be considered part of the evidence held
by the prosecution 54 and the Brady mandate is not limited to specific forms
of evidence, that decision arguably should apply to such materials if they
may contain "favorable" or "exculpatory" evidence.155 Apparently, the test
which has emerged from Brady is whether the suppression handicaps the
accused's ability to defend or inhibits the ultimate ascertainment of the
truth.156 It seems likely that grand jury testimony would often include
evidence which tends to prove the defendant's innocence and which
markedly improves the quality of his defense. For example, the transcript
may contain conflicting statements by different witnesses, the identity and
statements of a witness favorable to the defense, or relevant medical or
psychiatric reports-the suppression of each of which has been found
inconsistent with Brady.157 Moreover, if the concept of "materiality" utilized
tutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L. J. 136, 142-50 (1964);
Comment, 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 400 (1965); Note, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 425 (1966).
153 373 U. S. at 87. See generally Comment, Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal
Cases: Where Are We Headed?, 6 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 41, 45-50 (1967). The Court
stated: "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where -the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
373 U. S. at 87. Whether the Court used "material" in its literal sense is unclear, for
it is arguable that "favorable evidence" and "material evidence" are redundant. How-
ever, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, it would appear that "material"
qualifies the nature of the favorable evidence.
164 See Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F. R. D. 87,
87-88 (1964).
15 See United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). It has
been observed that Brady "covers any evidence either tending to prove... innocence
or ... affect ... punishment." Note, 19 OKLA. L. Rlv. 425, 426 (1966); cf. United
States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 421-23 (S. D. Ind. 1967).
M "In Brady . . . the Court made it clear that its primary interest was .. to
insure a fair trial to the defendant, and particularly to insure that the trial would bring
out, not hide, the truth." Jackson v. Wainwright, - F.2d -, - (5th Cir. 1968). Con-
sequently, "lower federal courts have emphasized the harm to the defendant .... "Id.;
accord, Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d
80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); see Comment, The Need for Lib-
eralized Rules of Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 49 MARQ. L. Rlv. 736, 742 (1966);
Comment The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant,
74.YALB L. J. 136, 142, 146-47 (1964); Note, 19 OKLA. L. Rnv. 425, 426 (1966).
117 See, e.g., Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968) (suppression of
statements of a witness favorable to the defense); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963) (psychiatric reports revealing defendant's
legal insanity withheld from defense counsel); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,
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by Brady encompasses all information which will ultimately affect the
determination of guilt or innocence, 58 it would seem arguable that grand
jury testimony of impeachment value should fall within the rule since the
effect of impeachment will be to significantly destroy the efficacy of the
prosecution's case.
It may also be contended that disclosure should be allowed prior to the
trial since, as Brady and subsequent cases indicate, the fundamental
question is whether the suppression caused an unfair trial because the
accused was thereby doomed to an uninformed and inadequate defense. 159
Thus, the effect of the withheld material on the defendant's preparation for
trial determines consistency with due process. Consequently, grand jury
testimony should be available to the defendant when it would assist him in
planning the course and nature of his defense.1 60 Relatedly, it would seem
221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955) (suppression of witnesses
whose testimony would conflict with that of prosecution's chief witness).
158 It would seem overly restrictive to limit the "material" evidence upon which
Brady operates, 373 U. S. at 87, to direct, substantive evidence alone. Evidence to im-
peach or test credibility, although perhaps not substantive as to the issues involved, is
material to the probity of the matters in issue. See C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 152 (1954). Moreover, if Brady applies to any evidence tending to demonstrate guilt
or innocence and is intended to insure that the trial will delineate the truth, as would
appear to be contemporary interpretation, see note 156 supra, then impeachment evi-
dence should clearly be encompassed since its function is to separate falsity from va-
lidity, and may ultimately, in fact if not in form, influence the determination of guilt
or innocence. See C. McCoRmcK, supra, § 39. Finally, it is arguable that the Supreme
Court includes impeachment or credibility evidence within the term "material" evi-
dence. Thus, in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957), the Court, reversing a
conviction because the trial court had refused a motion to compel the prosecution to
produce previously reported statements of various witnesses, noted that a necessity of
showing control between the reports and testimony would operate "to deny the ac-
cused evidence relevant and material to his defense," id. at 667, and that the defendant
could inspect the reports for only he could determine "the effective use for purpose of
discrediting the Government's witness and thereby furthering [his] ... defense .. .
Id. at 668-69 (emphasis added).
'15 Although Brady has been interpreted to apply only to motions for disclosure
made during the trial itself, see Carter, supra note 154, at 88, the more prevalent con-
struction has been to emphasize that the real harm resulting to a defendant from non-
disclosed evidence occurs before the trial since without the evidence the accused is
unable to construct and plan an effective defense and therefore is denied a fair trial.
See Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel, Meers
v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence
to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-47 (1964).
160See United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Cobb the
court recognized that grand jury testimony should be available to assist the defendant
in constructing his defense, but also felt it necessary to limit the extent to which
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that the defendant may also be entitled to relevant unfavorable evidence
since knowledge thereof is likely to aid the defendant in the structuring of
his case almost as much as material tending to aid in the establishment of
his innocence.16'
Granting that failure to disclose material relevant to the defense either
during or prefatory to trial may constitute a denial of due process, the
question remains, whether the rule may properly be afforded unlimited
application to grand jury testimony in light of the unique characteristics of
that material. Unlike other forms of evidence, grand jury transcripts remain
validly protected, in some cases by the traditional necessities for secrecy.162
Yet, there would seem little difficulty in adapting the procedural rule
promulgated in Dennis and accepted by the subsequent cases to limit the
dangers of inopportune disclosure: 163 the defendant should be entitled to all
relevant and useful portions of the transcript subject to the limitation of a
protective order obtained by the Government upon the need for secrecy or
other valid grounds. If a motion for such an order were made, the trial
judge would examine the material in camera to determine the propriety of
the defense could exercise a "fishing expedition" into government files. Id. at 163-64.
Consequently, the court held that the Government might fulfill its duty by disclosing
to the defendant prior to trial, information which is obviously exculpatory and which
would be of assistance in planning the defense, subject to the sanction of a mistrial
if its disclosure was not adequate. Id. at 164; cf. United States v. Aeroquip Corp., 41
F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
161 See Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 147 (1964). As the author of this comment notes, if
the evidence which comes under the aegis of the fifth amendment is limited to "excul-
patory" evidence, the prosecution is placed in the position of determining the value of
the materials to the defendant's case. Furthermore, if the material is "neutral," there
is no "duty" to reveal it, and thus a defendant might be deprived of evidence around
which he might build a stronger case, but which, alone, would not tend to show inno-
cence. Id.
16. For a list of the traditional rules of secrecy see text accompanying note 19
supra. Although these reasons may be valid during the grand jury proceedings, cf.
United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v.
Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63
MIcH. L. REv. 455, 458-60 (1965), it would appear that once the indictment has
issued the validity is lost. See United States v. Youngblood, supra at 370 n.3.
L3 See notes 137-40 supra and accompanying text. It may be contended that the
Supreme Court has given tacit approval to pre-trial discovery of a grand jury tran-
script for use in the preparation of the defendant's case. In United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), the defendant requested the transcript to assist in
the creation of his defense, since the Government had been able to utilize it to pre-
pare the prosecution. Id. at 678-79. In refusing this request, the Court did not provide
that the necessities of secrecy precluded pre-trial production, but held "only . . .that
no compelling necessity [was] shown for the wholesale discovery and production of
[the] ... transcript. . . " Id. at 683. Consequently, it would appear that the policy of
secrecy does not automatically prevent pre-trial disclosure.
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disclosure. Certainly the prosecutor should not play the determinative role
in the assessment of a claim for suppression, but rather he should be
required to reveal all pertinent information. Less consistent with the
argument that only the defendant appropriately determines what is useful to
his case would be a rule that the trial judge determine usefulness prior to
revealing the information to the defense, although such a procedure burdens
the judge with the advocate's role.164 Another alternative might be to
require the Government to furnish those portions of the transcript which are
clearly useful but permit it to deny disclosure where the value of the
material sought is doubtful, subject to declaration of a mistrial if the judge
finds the prosecutor's choice to be arbitrary. 165 In any event, it would
appear that viable governing rules could be developed by which the
defendant's due process guarantee of a fair trial could be effectively realized
while those aspects of secrecy necessarily accorded grand jury testimony are
preserved.
CONCLUSION
The proposed constitutional standards would provide beneficial
clarification and uniformity as to both the availability of disclosure in each
federal jurisdiction and the scope of access permitted. Not only would the
defendant's right to view the transcript upon request be established but
it would also be resolved that the testimony could be utilized for purposes
other than merely cross-examination. A constitutional standard would not,
however, be devoid of disabilities. For example, it is possible that a
relatively unimpeded right of access would be abused by defendants who
sought disclosure solely to effectuate a delay, to coerce or improperly
influence witnesses, or to gain access to information not of major
significance to the defense but which would otherwise have been necessary
to procure by unilateral efforts. It would seem likely, however, that the
judiciary could develop sanctions by which such abuse would be
discouraged. Although an attractive means of accomplishing this end may
be to require a demonstration of bona fides or some "semblance of need,"
the proven difficulties of adequately defining and administering such a
prerequisite would produce the same ambiguity which tortures present
disclosure rules. Consequently, it would be preferable to retain a liberal
initial standard and endeavor to preclude improper motivation by the
deterrence of post-request procedures.
16 See Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALE LJ. 136, 148 (1964). See also Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855, 874-75 (1966); Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1955),
affd en banc, 235 F.2d 664, cert.. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); Calkins, Grand Jury
Secrecy, 63 Mi.c. L. R.Ev. 455, 478-81 (1965).




A constitutionally based disclosure standard may also entail an increased
financial burden upon criminal administration by requiring, unlike present
practice, that grand jury testimony be consistently recorded. Such a rule
may be compelled by the contention that equal protection of the laws is
denied a defendant who is unable to utilize a grand jury transcript in the
preparation and presentation of his defense merely because the jurisdiction
in which he is indicted does not require recordation.' 66. Uniform
transcription requirements might also ensue from the potential ability in the
government prosecutor to avoid the operation of the standard in his
jurisdiction by persuading the judicial administration to cease recordation
or by indicting the multi-jurisdictional defendant, such as the corporate
defendant in a typical antitrust suit, in a district where testimony is
unrecorded. It may be further noted that potentially increased
administrative expense has not inhibited the adoption of other protections,
such as mandatory counsel or trial transcripts, for indigent defendants.
In sum, given the significant benefits of facile administration, clarity and
predictability of application, and uniformity redounding from a
constitutional standard for determining disclosure of grand jury transcripts,
the dangers of abuse and the cost of transcription seem but a small price
exacted for the assurance of a competent defense and a fair trial for the
criminal defendant.
1611 The Supreme Court has incorporated, at least in part, the concept of equal
protection into the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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